

**GALLATIN COUNTY, MONTANA, COURTS  
AUGUST 11-14, 2014**



**Review of Court Security Operation  
conducted by the  
National Sheriffs' Association  
prepared for Sheriff Brian Gootkin  
by Hilary Burgess  
published September 29, 2014**

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## Overview

The security of a courthouse is based on a balance of four essential components: involvement of all stakeholders, security personnel, technological devices, and the configuration of the physical plant. The absence of any of these components will negatively impact the security of a facility. An assessment of the Gallatin County Courts is a snapshot in time limited to the dates on which it was conducted.

The Law and Justice Center is located at 615 South 16th Avenue. It was originally constructed as a High School in 1961, and was purchased and renovated to the Law and Justice Center in 1978. The renovation included two District Courtrooms, Clerk of the Court, and other court related functions. A fire in the early 1990's destroyed part of the building. The Law and Justice Center was completed with a major renovation in 1993. Victim Services was added in 2000.

It was noted that multiple studies have been done in Gallatin County or the state of Montana over the last fifteen years. One such study was the "Courthouse Security Inspection"<sup>1</sup> in 2006 performed by the Montana Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation, at the request of the Montana Supreme Court Administrator's Office. Site inspections were conducted of all county courthouses in the state. Recommendations were made, but are not specific by county. It is recommended that the Gallatin County Sheriff's Office review this document for possible security recommendations that may or may not be included in this assessment also.

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<sup>1</sup> Montana Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation. 2006. *Courthouse Security Inspection*. Available from [http://courts.mt.gov/content/dcourt/dcc/docs/court\\_security\\_final\\_report.pdf](http://courts.mt.gov/content/dcourt/dcc/docs/court_security_final_report.pdf).

## Observations and Recommendations

The following are observations, comments and recommendations relative to the court security operation in Gallatin County, Montana. These were not the result of a full court security assessment but rather incidental to the staffing analysis that was being conducted. As such we are not indicating that all aspects of the court security operation were observed, all areas of the courthouse seen, and all relevant personnel interviewed. Also, the order in which they are presented is not indicative of any priority.

**Observation 1:** The building itself is cause for concern as negative findings have been examined in multiple previous assessments, analyses, and letters. A study from October 2004 explained that while the general physical condition of the building is good and has been well maintained, a previous report indicated the 1993 construction did not comply with the contract requirements based on physical observations and may result in the building being considered a lower classification of construction. Deficiencies in the lateral load resisting system exist in the front portions of the building not renovated in 1993. These areas would sustain significant damage in a major earthquake and should be brought up to current code requirements.<sup>2</sup> A similar finding was examined earlier in a 1999 structural evaluation where the fourth general conclusion states, “Building Area A [North half of the west wing], since it is an independent structural system and detached from the other two areas could sustain significant damage in a major earthquake.”<sup>3</sup> A letter in 2005 from Chief Building Official Neil R. Poulsen references this finding as well stating, “The Lateral System analysis in the code review, particularly for building ‘A’ where you are proposing a remodel, and building ‘B’ has ‘serious deficiencies’ must be addressed.”<sup>4</sup>

An additional letter from Architect/President Ben Lloyd of Comma-Q Architecture Inc. states, “It is understood that Gallatin County considers the Law and Justice Center to be a ‘short-term’ facility with an estimated remaining life of 14 years (to be abandoned in 2019)...The existing Law & Justice Center should be abandoned by the county before 2014...New construction or extensive renovation must occur very soon and in this case new construction represents a superior value over renovation.”<sup>5</sup>

**Recommendation 1:** Bring the entire building up to current code requirements. Or, part of the 2004 study’s recommendations included, “construct[ing] a new purpose-built 65,000 SF Court/Judicial Building adjacent to the new Jail to the south.”<sup>2</sup> Additionally, many of the recommendations that follow are also included in the General Guidelines of the April 7, 2011 *Campus Master Plan Gallatin Law and Justice Center* for the design of a new court related facility.

**Observation 2:** There are three un-manned public entrances/exits to the Law and Justice Center with no screening station in place. They use a screening process, which involves moving a

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<sup>2</sup> Carter Goble Lee and Kaplan McLaughlin Diaz. October, 2004. *Gallatin County/Bozeman Criminal Justice Space and Facilities Needs Assessment Final Report* (pp. 47-48, 68). Available from [http://www.gallatin.mt.gov/public\\_documents/cjsspacereport.pdf](http://www.gallatin.mt.gov/public_documents/cjsspacereport.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Prugh & Lenon Architects, PC, MTStructural Consultants, Bronec & Associates, Inc., & Van Dyken Engineering. March 1999. *Law & Justice Center Building Analysis* (p. 7).

<sup>4</sup> Poulsen, Neil. Letter to Ben Lloyd. 8 Nov. 2005. TS.

<sup>5</sup> Lloyd, Ben. Letter to Larry Watson. 28 Nov. 2005. TS.

portable magnetometer to the specific courtroom being used and screening everyone who enters the courtroom, only when they have a known threat.

**Recommendation 2a:** Screening at a single entrance is the more accepted standard practice and removes the noise and confusion associated with the present situation from the area of the courts and gives staff more control while providing a secure environment for everyone within the courthouse. Limiting screening to only certain times or for certain events also opens the door to “failure to protect” issues that can present themselves with adverse notoriety or, worse yet, wrongful death or injury litigation.

It is recommended that the main entrance to the Law and Justice Center on the West side of the building remain open and that the other two entrances on the North and South ends be closed to the public. Entry through these two doors should be controlled by a keyless entry system or access cards for building employees and they should be designated as emergency exits for the public. Additionally, a screening station should be constructed at the top of the stairs with x-ray and magnetometer staffed by officers at the new single public entrance that places the staff one step up from floor level, incorporates a barrier between the public and staff and contains ballistic material. A photo of a station that might be used as a guide is below on the right. Concessions will have to be made for those court users who require ADA accessibility as the main entrance does not comply with ADA accessibility requirements associated with building access. They may have to be escorted into the building’s North end entrance and then screened by a deputy.



Main entrance on West side



Example screening station

**Recommendation 2b:** If a single point of entry with screening is not established, it is recommended to have, at a minimum, one sworn, armed deputy using a hand wand for screening at each of the three entrances.

**Observation 3:** Even if a screening operation is established, it should still be understood that to prevent unauthorized firearms from being brought into the courthouse there is no foolproof system and so the possibility of a firearm being introduced does exist.

**Recommendation 3:** It is recommended that ballistic material be installed on the inside of each judicial bench so that judges will have the ability to seek cover and concealment if necessary. Also, the table at which criminal defendants are seated should be bolted to the floor to prevent

them from being flipped over during an altercation. The chairs defendants sit in should have arms and not have casters so that their ability to quickly rise up is limited.

**Observation 4:** The number of deputies assigned to building security staffing, which includes the courthouse and county attorney, consists of one sworn, armed deputy with additional help as needed from patrol, investigations, and other divisions who are available. The number of deputies who may be in the courts is dependent on the number of prisoners attending court and there is not sufficient staff to establish assignments. Deputies are called from patrol and investigations to transport prisoners between the jail and courts. The short staffing further heightens the potential for an undesired incident and is inadequate when considering the following:

- The number of judges assigned to the courthouse.
- The volume of prisoners produced to court which must be moved through public areas and there being no holding areas adjacent to the courtrooms.
- The number of members of the public who are often present in the facility.
- The courthouse design does not meet current standards for security.

**Recommendation 4:** The *National Courthouse/Court Facility Staffing Guidelines* (copy attached at Appendix) authored by Sheriff John Zaruba of DuPage County, IL applied to Gallatin County call for the following staffing levels: one officer for each courtroom (three District Court and one Standing Master); two officers for each magnetometer\*; one officer for each x-ray machine\*; one Supervisor; a two-officer prisoner movement team and a 10 % coverage factor. This is a total of eleven (11) building security staff. We recommend that a minimum of eight (8) staff be employed and assigned to the courthouse immediately. This increase would allow for a two-officer prisoner movement team, two officers to be deployed to courtrooms (1 per floor – second and third level), moving about as judges take and leave the bench and as needed based upon courtroom activity, one officer as a coverage factor and to be deployed as needed, two officers dedicated to the screening operation and the Supervisor present in the courthouse to assign and reassign personnel, deploy themselves as needed and to respond to emergencies. For this number of new positions to work there must be a commitment to not reassigning personnel out of the courthouse under routine circumstances.

\*If Recommendation 2a is implemented.

**Observation 5:** When there are prisoners in the courtroom, they are seated in the public area with a rope blocking access to the bench behind or next to them so that there is one empty bench between prisoners and the public. The officer who transported them will monitor the inmates in the courtroom and as much of the public as possible.

**Recommendation 5:** It would be recommended that additional barriers be placed alongside the prisoner area.

**Observation 6:** Inmate movement from the jail to the court is through an exterior secure fenced walkway not screened from the public.

**Recommendation 6:** It is recommended that signage indicating prohibition of loitering in the area and contacting the prisoners and allowing only authorized personnel would discourage persons loitering in the area.

**Observation 7:** Inmate movement once inside the courthouse involves prisoners being transported to the floor of their courtroom by the public elevator. All movement of prisoners after arrival at the courthouse is in areas accessible to the public.

**Recommendation 7:** The current facility is not adequate to allow for inmate movement in private circulation areas. Having crowd control techniques in place as the prisoners are being moved within the facility will greatly enhance safety for all court users. Additionally, training, or at the very least, briefings should be had with all civilian employees and elected officials as to what the expectation of them is when they encounter prisoners being moved through the hallways and other areas of the courthouse and vicinity. This will enhance their personal safety and the efficiency of the prisoner movement process.

**Observation 8:** It was noted that some Judges use court recess as a punishment if inmates are produced from the jail to court late. The result of this is the deputy(ies) having to sit in the courtroom, during which time they cannot be doing other duties, with the inmates until court is back in session. There are no holding areas in the courthouse. This kind of retribution is not an accepted safe standard of practice as the longer the prisoners are in court, the potential for an incident to occur becomes greater.

**Recommendation 8:** Possible solutions are to either prioritize and expedite the calling of prisoner cases once the prisoners are produced in the courtroom or to create a separate prisoner calendar call at a specific time or times. To further assist in this endeavor, it is strongly recommended that a process be put into place wherein prisoners who are only going to have their cases adjourned to another date not be produced at all. The forgoing suggestions will require the cooperation of several stakeholders: the Judiciary, defense bar, District Attorney, County Attorney, Sheriff, clerical staff and others.

**Observation 9:** While there is a duress alarm system for the judges (with buttons on their benches and in their offices), the system is maxed out so no additional duress alarms can be added to the system. The response time is slow because of how the duress alarms are routed through dispatch. They go through two call centers before a deputy in the courthouse is alerted.

**Recommendation 9:** Update the system so that more alarms can be added if/when needed. Research if the alarms can be routed directly to a deputy on duty or at least go straight to the 911 call center in Bozeman so that they can dispatch a deputy.

**Observation 10:** It was indicated that there is no official training for judges.

**Recommendation 10:** It is recommended that a judicial security packet be developed and given to each judge. This packet should contain emergency contact information, information about personal safety for the judge and family, and guidance regarding threats against judges.

**Observation 11:** It was indicated that no practice drills for emergency evacuation and lockdown plans for the courthouse are conducted.

**Recommendation 11:** Written evacuation and lockdown plans for the courthouse and standard operating procedures for court security operations should be created if they do not currently exist. SOP's for such functions as prisoner movements, screening operations, courtroom security, and emergency situations should be developed. Evacuation and lockdown plans should be promulgated, periodic drills and training should be conducted to include, where appropriate, civilian personnel working in the facility. Sheriff's personnel newly assigned to the court security unit should be provided in-service training relative to this assignment. Sheriff John Aubrey of Jefferson County, KY has promulgated a document called, "*What Do I Do If...*", which each civilian employee in Jefferson County Courthouses is provided. It describes the expected response of the employee to lockdown, lockout, hostage, evacuation, prisoner escape or rapid deployment event, and natural disasters. It is contained in the appendix of this document and is easily adaptable to virtually any jurisdiction or facility.

**Observation 12:** It was observed that there are numerous counters staffed by clerical personnel who interact with the public and that there are no barriers between the private and public sides of the counters.

**Recommendation 12:** Consideration should be given to installing Plexiglas windows at the counters. This would provide protection for the staff and preclude the possibility of someone reaching across the counter and acquiring an item that could be used as a weapon.

**Observation 13:** It was indicated that searches of the courtrooms and other areas of the courthouse are not routinely conducted.

**Recommendation 13:** A practice of searching the courtrooms and other areas, including the area immediately outside the building, each morning prior to the opening of the courthouse to the public should be established.

**Observation 14:** The Law and Justice Center has a CCTV system that allows for monitoring of some of the critical areas of the courthouse. Unfortunately, because of the staffing shortages, the system is not monitored on an ongoing basis.

**Recommendation 14:** One suggested option to be evaluated and considered is to have the personnel monitoring the CCTV system in the jail also monitor the courts system. Camera locations, angles, etc. should be reviewed to make sure cameras are setup to obtain the best image possible. Also, the addition of a public address system would be of value especially during emergency situations as well as daily operations.

**Observation 15:** Dedicated and secure parking is not provided for judges, law enforcement, staff, or jurors. There is dedicated parking located on the East side of the building for law enforcement and staff, and some is marked by signage for judges.

**Recommendation 15:** Evaluate the feasibility of constructing a secure parking area on the East side of the building.



**Observation 16:** All current entrances into this courthouse are for everyone's use (only inmates have a private entrance, but it opens up into a public area).

**Recommendation 16:** Once the North and South end entrances are closed to the public, these can be established as possible private entrances for judges, law enforcement, and staff.

**Observation 17:** There are no physical barriers to prevent intrusion by vehicle. There are staircases and landscape features, which could delay and make breach by a vehicle difficult. However, the landscape features would be easy to drive around.



West main entrance to L&J Center with planter barriers




North ADA entrance to L&J Center with planter barrier

**Recommendation 17:** Add additional physical barriers around the perimeter of the building that will be more apt to prevent intrusion.

**Observation 18:** The windows on the first floor of the Law and Justice Center allow individuals to be clearly seen from the outside. Additionally, the stairwell on the South side of the building can be clearly seen through.



South side stairwell



North side stairwell

**Recommendation 18:** Ideally, install ballistic glass in these exterior windows. In the alternative, install one-way vision film or at the very least blinds/shades on these windows. The stairwell on the North side of the building has windows that are tinted like stained-glass. Something similar to this on the South side would suffice.

**Observation 19:** Multiple generators and outdoor equipment are not fenced or secured. This poses a safety threat to those in the building in the event that someone disables them and there is no power, etc.



Examples of generators/equipment that are not enclosed

**Recommendation 19:** Surround the generators and equipment with fencing to discourage the public from tampering with it.

**Observation 20:** Communication tower on the East side of the building is accessible for someone to climb to where they'd then have access into office and courtroom windows.



Communication tower

**Recommendation 20:** Surround the tower with fencing to discourage the public from trying to climb.


**Observation 21:** Both the exterior and interior boiler room doors as well as the exterior switch room door on the East side of the building, basement level were left propped open by maintenance staff. These provide the opportunity for someone to obtain noxious and caustic substances and possibly edged weapons. The ladders on the wall outside the doors could give someone access to other areas of the courthouse.



Exterior boiler room door open



Interior boiler room door propped open



Exterior switch room and boiler room doors open

**Recommendation 21:** Establish rules and training with maintenance staff to make sure that these doors remain closed and locked. If a single point of entry is established with manned screening, it will be especially important to keep additional entrances, like the boiler room, closed to the public so that weapons and contraband cannot be secreted into the facility.

## APPENDIX

## NATIONAL COURTHOUSE/COURT FACILITY STAFFING GUIDELINES

*Sheriff John E. Zaruba  
DuPage County, Illinois*

How much courthouse/courtroom security is too much and is there a formula for an adequate/minimum security force?

*The answer comes only after the accomplishing the following steps.*

### **Step One:**

Conduct a threat analysis. Assess your historical threats, your current threats and your anticipated future threats. Jurisdictions are similar based on demographics. Research and then assess. Include worker/workplace events. Workplace violence in a judicial setting is 15 times the national average.

### **Step Two:**

Complete an accurate and thorough court facility **site** survey. Assess your facility's external and internal weaknesses. Assess your policy and procedures by testing them. Assess your staff, their physical and psychological abilities, training, commitment and security levels. Assess your practices against CALEA Chapters 71, 72 and 73 standards.

### **Step Three:**

Establish a **security committee** made up of all users of your court facility(s). Now, add to this a member of your funding source (County Board/Commissioners, etc). Review the results of steps 1 and 2 together and jointly decide your course of action. This step will be the most difficult but it will help create a mutual understanding and a mutual direction that will increase your level of security.

During your discussions, these mandatory questions must be answered:

*Who is legally responsible for court security?*

*What is the level of security desired for each location?*

*Are you going to be gun free? Who is authorized to carry firearms in the facility?*

*Is security for all or for some? (Passes)*

*Is funding available now, can security be phased or is this as good as it gets?*

*Can the eight security zones be segregated physically, temporally, or procedurally? Are they cross-contaminated?*

*Is staffing adequate to protect and preserve the judicial integrity of the criminal justice system? Staffing is not just people placed in positions. An adequate staffing analysis requires looking at all phases of human resource management.*

## **STAFFING ANALYSIS PHASES**

Recruitment

Hiring

Training (*Basic/Specific*) Placement

Retention

Command

*The following post assignment staffing guidelines should be used as a general guide for the provision of proper security staffing of your courtroom/facility. The factors which determine adequate staffing for your specific courtroom/facility will be determined by you utilizing steps one, two and three above.*

## **STAFFING GUIDELINES**

Large Counties and Cities:

### *Courtrooms*

Civil Court	1
Criminal Court	2 (additional security assigned as justified)
Juvenile	2
Domestic	2
City Court (Traffic)	2

Building Security      Posts as delineated by security survey and special justification

### *Court Facility*

Criminal	2
Civil	1
Juvenile	2
Domestic	2

Floor Security      1 (minimum each floor)

Supervisory ratio      1 for every 6 court operations

Unique posts where identified by security survey and special justification

10% relief factor

**Small Counties:**

*Courtrooms/Facilities*

Criminal Court	minimum 1
Civil Court	minimum 1
Other	minimum 1

Security position                      1 over each court operation per judge

Additional building security positions as identified by court security survey and special justification

10% relief factor

**City Courts: (Small)**

*Courtroom/Facility*

Criminal Court	minimum 1
Civil Court	minimum 1
Other	minimum 1

Security position                      1 over each court operation per judge

Additional security positions as identified by court security survey and special justification

**Superior - Appellate - Supreme Courts**

*Courtroom/Facility*

Criminal Court	3 and 1 supervisor
Civil Court	1

1 senior officer for every four-full time judicial hearing officers



Additional security positions as identified by court security survey and special justification.

10% relief factor

**Other Courts:**

*Courtroom/Facility:*

1 full-time security position for each court facility operation

Criminal Court	1.5
Family Court	1.5
Family Court Hearings	1
Civil Court	1

Additional security positions as identified by court security survey and special justification

**COURT SUPERVISION (Generally)**

1 Supervisor in-Charge for each court facility operation

1 Assistant Supervisor In-Charge for each court that has more than one location with 5 or more regularly scheduled courts or has 50 or more court security officers assigned to a single location

1 Staff assistant for each Responsible Supervisor In-Charge **OR** Assistant Supervisor In-Charge with a maximum of one per facility

1 Supervisor to cover public security entrance

10% relief

**ADDITIONAL STAFFING GUIDELINES**

**Magnetometer/ X-ray Staffing**

Magnetometer	2
X-ray	1

## **Entrance Staffing**

Pass line	1
Canine (Bomb)	1

## **Prisoner Transportation**

As necessary based on Risk Assessment

## **SPECIALIZED STAFFING CONCERNS: (Additional staffing and policy required)**

24/7/365 SECURITY (*Preferred*)

MASTER CONTROL

TRAINING

FACILITY RESPONSE

ALARMS

MEDICAL EMERGENCIES

OTHER EMERGENCIES

FIRE OR WEATHER EVACUATION

ESCAPE

ILLEGAL ENTRY

JUDICIAL SECURITY

THREAT ASSESSMENT/ ADJUSTMENT/INVESTIGATION

PROPERTY CONTROL

ARREST/INVESTIGATION/DETENTION

SPECIAL OPERATIONS/DEMONSTRATIONS

FACILITY SHUTDOWN

HIGH RISK TRIAL

HIGH PROFILE TRIAL

MONEY ESCORTS

PERSONAL JUDICIAL SECURITY

MEDIA

**JEFFERSON COUNTY TRIAL COURTS**

**LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY**

***"What do I do  
if..."***

**The  
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES  
MANUAL  
For  
COURT EMPLOYEES**

March, 2002

## *Welcome to...* The Jefferson County Judicial Complex

This **Emergency Procedures Manual** - "**What Do I Do If ?**" applies only to the Hall of Justice and the Judicial Center. The infrastructure safety systems in both buildings utilize some of the most sophisticated and proven technology available in life safety, fire detection and fire suppression. In addition, both buildings are staffed with Deputy Sheriffs of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. All Deputies are trained and certified in first aid and CPR.

This manual is designed to answer the question, "What do I do if...?" should an emergency situation occur. Keep it handy. By thoroughly familiarizing yourself with the procedures described below you can significantly decrease your own and others chances of injury and increase the likelihood of safety and survivability for yourself and your fellow employees. Above all ... **REMAIN CALM!**

### **Important Notes**

These notes are potentially applicable to any of the emergency situations described in this manual.

### **Who Do I Call?**

Call the Sheriff's Office. In the **Hall of Justice** call **Omega 1 control room** at **574-0888**. In the **Judicial Center** call **Nova 1 control room** at **574-1888**.

### **Evacuation**

**NOTICE:** The decision to evacuate the building(s) will be made by the Sheriff's Office and announced by Facilities Management over the Public Address System. It is imperative that you follow instructions **to the letter**, proceeding to the designated off-site location and remaining there for further instructions.

**KNOW THE NEAREST FIRE EXIT** to your work station. Further, wherever you may be temporarily in either building throughout the course of your day, take note of where the closest fire exit to you is located. The closest fire exit to you will be your point of evacuation in all circumstances.

**NEVER USE THE ELEVATORS** if instructed to evacuate. Use the fire exit stairs nearest you.

# **BIOCHEMICAL THREAT**

The most likely biochemical threat to the Courts will arrive as either a letter delivered by regular mail, a parcel delivered by mail by a delivery service, a parcel or other object (ex.: briefcase) left by a person or persons.

If you discover a suspicious letter or package follow these procedures:

1. Do not touch the object or attempt to move it.
2. Notify your supervisor. If your supervisor is not available call the Sheriff's Office **(Omega 1 at 574-0888 in the Hall of Justice, Nova 1 at 574-1888 in the Judicial Center).**
3. Remain calm.
4. Do not leave your work area. Stay where you are and wait for further instructions from the Sheriff's Office via Facilities Management over the Public Address system.

# **BOMB THREAT**

## **Unknown Location**

A bomb threat will most likely be received over the phone. A suspicious package or object left out of place (such as a briefcase) might contain a bomb. You may or may not know the location (or type) of bomb.

Regardless of how the threat is made, discovered or perceived, follow the 4 main procedures described here:

1. Remain calm. If there is a suspicious object near you and you believe there is imminent danger of explosion (the object is ticking, for example) do not touch it. Immediately move away and calmly ask others near by to move away. Then;
2. Call the Sheriff's Office (**Omega 1 at 574-0888 in the Hall of Justice, Nova 1 at 574-1888 in the Judicial Center**).
3. Notify your supervisor.
4. In most cases stay where you are. Wait for instructions from Facilities Management over the Public Address System or the Sheriff's Office.

## **Threat by Phone**

Try to gain as much information as possible about the location and type of bomb, detonation time and the reason(s) for its placement. Use the information on the next page as a guide. Then follow the 4 main steps listed above.

## **Suspicious Object**

1. Do not touch the object or make any attempt to move it.

1. Follow the 4 main steps listed above.
2. Do not turn lights or other electrical items on or off.
3. Halt all two-way radio (CB, walkie-talkie), cell phone and pager use.
4. Inspect your immediate work area, note and report any unknown, unusual, foreign objects.
5. Be aware of any deliveries made prior to the threat, even if made through normal procedures. Report them.

# **IF YOU RECEIVE A BOMB THREAT**

**TIME AND DATE REPORTED:** \_\_\_\_\_

**HOW REPORTED:** \_\_\_\_\_

**EXACT WORDS OF CALLER:**  
\_\_\_\_\_

**QUESTIONS TO ASK (IF POSSIBLE):**

a) **Where is the bomb right now?** \_\_\_\_\_

b) **When is the bomb going to explode?** \_\_\_\_\_

c) **What kind of bomb is it?** \_\_\_\_\_

d) **What does it look like?** \_\_\_\_\_

e) **Why did you place the bomb?** \_\_\_\_\_

f) **Where are you calling from?** \_\_\_\_\_

**DESCRIPTION OF CALLER'S VOICE:**

**Male**\_\_\_\_\_**Female**\_\_\_\_\_**Young**\_\_\_\_\_**Middle Age**\_\_\_\_\_**Old**\_\_\_\_\_**Accent**\_\_\_\_\_

**Tone of Voice**\_\_\_\_\_

**BACKGROUND NOISE**\_\_\_\_\_ **IS VOICE FAMILIAR?**\_\_\_\_\_

**IF SO, WHO DID IT SOUND LIKE?** \_\_\_\_\_

**OTHER VOICE CHARACTERISTICS:**

**Calm**\_\_\_\_\_**Angry**\_\_\_\_\_**Nervous**\_\_\_\_\_**Serious**\_\_\_\_\_**Drunk**\_\_\_\_\_**Sober**\_\_\_\_\_

**TIME CALLER HUNG UP**\_\_\_\_\_ **REMARKS** \_\_\_\_\_

**YOUR NAME, FLOOR, ROOM # & PHONE** \_\_\_\_\_

# **CATASTROPHIC EVENT**

A catastrophe occurs when part or all of a building is suddenly damaged beyond use. A terrorist attack caused the September 11, 2001 catastrophe to the World Trade Center in New York. However, it is important to recognize that natural disasters can and have been the cause of even more widespread sudden destruction and loss of human life.

In Louisville, the threat of a sudden massive earthquake, though remote, is quite real. Knowing what to do immediately after a catastrophe can mean survival for yourself and others.

Disorientation, fear and a sense of panic are natural reactions in surviving the initial impact of a catastrophe. You are a victim just as much as you are a survivor. If you are injured you need to try and avoid going into shock. Clinical shock is almost completely incapacitating and can lead to unconsciousness and death.

Having a definite plan of steps to undertake will help you focus on survival. Do not give up. Know that you can survive, reaching safety and obtaining medical care. Survival will be easier if you remain calm, focused, careful, alert and patient remembering to keep your wits about you.

After the moment(s) of a catastrophe follow these steps in order:

1. **Identify and attend to any injuries** you may have.

Moving as little as possible, check for injuries. Attend to bleeding wounds, broken bones or sprains as best you can. The goal is to bandage yourself enough so that you can either evacuate or remain where you are, temporarily stabilized and wait for help.

If you must remain where you are, especially if due to injury, conserve your energy. **Listen** for approaching help. Only call out for help when help is nearby.

2. **Note any overhanging rubble** or debris around you, looking especially for exposed electrical wires.

**Look** above and all around you. Pay attention to everything. Is there rubble about to fall on you from overhead? Are there exposed electrical cords anywhere near you? Completely avoid cords (and metal rubble or water touching them). Move carefully away, if you can, from threatening overhead rubble. If you cannot move, try to protect your face and head as best you can.

3. **Evacuate the building rubble** and move to off-site safety and medical care.

Before you move, look toward the direction in which you will evacuate. What are the obstructions in your path? Evaluate the situation and then carefully begin to exit the building.

Visually inspect rubble before moving it out of the way. It may be concealing another victim or exposed electrical wires.



If you discover other victims, do what you can for them. If they are injured and cannot move on their own **DO NOT** try to move them. Try to calm them if they are afraid. However, do not stay with them. Somehow mark the person's location in an identifiable way. Continue to evacuate the building, advising them you will notify help as soon as possible.

As soon as you encounter official rescue workers identify yourself, describe any wounds you might have, advise them of the other victims you encountered during your evacuation and how you marked their location(s).

**Remember:** In surviving a catastrophe, your goal is to evacuate off-site of the destruction to professional safety and emergency medical care.

# EARTHQUAKE

Earthquakes could pose a threat to the Louisville area. Since earthquakes strike without warning, immediately follow these procedures:

## During An Earthquake

During the shaking phase of an earthquake, be prepared to take the following actions:

1. Remain calm.
2. Take shelter under a desk or sturdy table, or against an interior wall or doorway. Stay away from windows and shelves. Do not try to exit the building unless instructed to do so by the Sheriff's Office or other official emergency personnel (Fire, EMS, Police, etc.).

## After An Earthquake

After the shaking phase of an earthquake, be prepared to take the following actions:

1. Check your immediate area for injured persons. If discovered contact the Sheriff's Office (**Omega 1** in the Hall of Justice at 574-0888, **Nova 1** in the Judicial Center at 574-1888).
2. Do not attempt to use the elevators. Do not turn on electrical switches and do not touch electrical wires.
3. Use great caution when moving around damaged areas.
4. If there is no sign of trouble in your immediate area, stay where you are. Await for instructions from the Sheriff's Office via Facilities Management over the Public Address system.
5. Be alert for aftershocks.

# **ELEVATOR PROCEDURE**

Elevators are among the safest modes of transportation available. Most elevator stops which entrap passengers temporarily are due to the activation of one of the many safety features designed into the elevator. Please be assured that modern elevators are designed to fail in favor of safety.

Please advise your co-workers to follow these procedures in the event that an elevator stops, temporarily entrapping its passengers

1. Remain calm, there is no reason to panic.
2. Press the alarm button. This will automatically contact the Jefferson County Sheriffs control room.
3. Answer the questions when asked.
4. DO NOT attempt to force open the elevator doors or to leave by any other method.
5. Trained elevator technicians will respond promptly. Building Facilities Management personnel will keep you advised of the progress in correcting the problem.

# **FIRE**

**Important:** From your work area know the locations of and quickest routes to the nearest fire exits (stairwells), fire alarms (located next to stairwell doors) and fire extinguishers. Occasionally, practice walking directly from your work area to each of these locations. Note any difficulties you may experience and report them to your supervisor.

Always evacuate **DOWN** using the designated stairs. Never attempt to evacuate via the elevator.

If you discover a fire (open flame) follow these procedures:

1. Remain calm.
2. Activate the nearest fire alarm.
3. Call the Sheriffs Office in the **Hall of Justice, Omega 1 at 574-0888, in the Judicial Center, Nova 1 at 574-1888.**
4. **EVACUATION:** The decision to evacuate the building(s) will be made by the Sheriff's Office and announced by Facilities Management over the Public Address System. It is imperative that you follow the instructions **to the letter**, proceeding to the designated location and remaining there for further instructions.

**NOTE:** As you descend the stairs keep to the right side of the steps. This will allow emergency personnel access to the stairs.

If there is smoke in the stairwell crouch low and try to get under the smoke. Continue to descend the stairs as efficiently as possible.

# MEDICAL EMERGENCY

Call the Sheriff's Office if you or a person in your presence experiences a medical emergency.

All Sheriff's Deputies are trained in CPR and First Aid.

1. **Hall of Justice:** Call Omega 1 at 574-0888.  
**Judicial Center:** Call Nova 1 at 574-1888.
2. First, identify yourself and your location. Second, describe the problem in these specific terms: State the person's sex, race, age, type of injury, status (conscious, convulsing, etc.) and location.
3. Do not move the person if injured.

## **POWER OUTAGE**

In the event of a power outage, remain CALM. The building emergency power system will automatically activate within seconds. Power will be provided to emergency lights throughout the building, life safety equipment, elevators and other functions vital to building operations. All elevators will return one at a time to the lobby level (or appropriate service floor). One elevator per elevator bank will remain in service.

To assist building operations, please refrain from contacting the Facilities Management Office except in the event of an emergency. Turn off the lights and other electrical equipment in your area to facilitate the return of power.

# **TORNADO WARNING**

Tornados pose a severe threat in Louisville. If a Tornado Warning is issued in Jefferson County, alarms will sound throughout the downtown area. The Facilities Management Office will keep tenants advised via the public address system.

Upon being alerted over the Public Address System by Facilities Management of a tornado warning, immediately follow these procedures:

Evacuate to the nearest location to you designated below:

**Hall of Justice:** Move to the inner courtroom nearest to you..

**Judicial Center:** Floors 1,2, & 3 move to the basement via the stairs (fire exits). Floors 4 - 10 move to the courtrooms on your floors.

1. Stay away from the windows and outer walls.
2. Do not attempt to leave the building.
3. Do not contact the Sheriff's Office except in an emergency. Facilities Management will keep you informed via the Public Address System.